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ABSTRACT
Violence, Transcendence and Spectacle in the Age of Social Media:
#JeSuisCharlie Demonstrations and Hollande’s Speech
After the 2015 Terrorist Attacks
Barbara Osorio DeSoto
Department of French & Italian, BYU
Master of Arts
This study examines the reactions — both in real life and on social media — to two
terrorist attacks in Paris: satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in January 2015 and the Bataclan
shooting in November 2015. Using Richard Sennett’s Fall of Public Man and Antonin Artaud’s
Le théâtre et son double to explore these reactions as theater, this approach reveals the religious
nature of supposedly secular reactions to religious extremism.
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I. Introduction
The 2014 terrorist attacks on French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo became a social
media sensation almost immediately, much like the later attacks on Paris that same year. All over
social media, profile pictures were changed to the tricolor and hashtag solidarity fomented a
seemingly united Western front against terrorism. Much of the apparent unequivocal support for
freedom of speech, however, can be analyzed as a sort of spectacle after each of these terrible
events, a message communicated by the state and the elites that usually control it: the
#JeSuisCharlie marches in January, and President Hollande’s speech after the November attacks.
Complete with a mise en scène, costumes, music, props, and spectators in France and around the
world, conveying a message that re-contextualizes the simple facts of the events, the spectacles
themselves constitute a massive secular ritual that was encouraged and exploited by the state and
its elite allies who heavily influence traditional media. However, in spite of the spoken message
of the performances, the French state appears not to foment, but to syphon and even extinguish
expression in order to channel the narrative power of the terrorist acts into political, and
ultimately, economic power. Participation on social media added breadth to the mise en scène,
expanding the spectacle’s potential audience and legitimizing its message – that blasphemy
against Islam represents the essence of Republican values. The ensuing debates after the attacks
concerning free speech and censorship are nothing new; social media, on the other hand,
represents new territory for public expression, namely, of interaction. But these new platforms –
ultimately neoliberal in nature – actually serve to facilitate state control, supporting the spectacle
with yet another illusion, that of democratization of expression and communal interaction, and
forcing expression into a binary good-evil narrative prone to symbolic simplification. We will
examine, through the two spectacle events and their extension into the sphere of social media,
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how this symbolization occurs, who appears to mold the narrative, and the potential dangers
concerning what it ultimately could be used to accomplish.
This study will explore spectacle in this interactive layer of social media, in the context of
which we will analyze Sennett’s “social geography” and the expressive acts surrounding it. We
will approach two “spectacles” – the January 2015 #JeSuisCharlie demonstrations, and the
speech of French President François Hollande following the terrorist attacks later that year – and
analyze them using two spectacle-expression theories: Richard Sennett’s Fall of Public Man, and
Antonin Artaud’s Le Théâtre et son double, paying special attention to religiously coded
language, ritualistic forms of expression, and the obfuscation of Western violence. Finally, we
will discuss problematic illusions of social media, contrasting 2009’s #iranelection with the
Charlie and Invalides “spectacles.”
It is from a political and media ambiance in which the discussion of the horrific and
unconscionable terrorist attacks and their victims was not only dominant, but necessary. Though
it is undeniable that moral judgments can and should be made concerning the facts of these
events, my goal here is not to emphasize or explore them as an end itself, but to search beyond
and beneath them, to the underlying historical and rhetorical forces that move upon our very
affective involvement with the victims and their story. Indeed, as we will establish, the violence
itself is heavily implicated in my analysis of the commemorative events as theater. Therefore, my
mention, if any, of the terrorist violence and the moral outrage that naturally followed from this
point will be accompanied by deeper analysis, though this is not intended to negate or obscure
the attacks’ tragic violence.
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II. Charlie Hebdo and the failing old media
The terrorist attacks on the Paris offices of satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo on January
7, 2015, made an immediate global impression, undoubtedly due to the reach of instant Internet
news and social networks. Two masked men armed with assault rifles forcibly entered the office
building that housed the magazine’s editorial operations and killed 12 of its staff, including 5 of
the publication’s cartoonists. The attackers also targeted a Kosher grocery store. As the world
watched France’s reaction – including marches of solidarity with the victims throughout the
country – pundits, journalists, academics, and politicians began a debate that has examined
Charlie Hebdo and the violence perpetrated against it from every angle, usually treating the
validity of the magazine’s satire and caricature, and often declaring that satire as freedom of
expression is essential and inviolate. But Charlie Hebdo, itself a little-read niche publication
with falling 1 circulation – around 60,000 before the attacks (“Post-attack Charlie Hebdo weekly
circulation tops 7 million”) – created in the long-accepted tradition of gross political caricature,
is much less revolutionary than pundits hope, and in the end, less important than the outsized
reaction on new media to its demise would indicate. Months later, in November 2015 and along
the route of the #JeSuisCharlie march in Paris, gunmen opened fire on a crowd at the Bataclan
theater on Boulevard Voltaire, killing 90 people and injuring, even torturing, many others.
Coordinated attacks in locations throughout the capital were carried out simultaneously, notably
at the Stade de France. The terrorist acts, more brutal and deadly than the Charlie Hebdo attacks,
awoke France anew to the threat of terrorism, and a solemn ceremony to commemorate the
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By comparison, leftist newspaper Libération “At its peak, in 2001, … enjoyed a circulation
over 170,000, though this has fallen to around 105,000 as of 2013.” (France24)
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victims was held weeks later at Les Invalides, featuring President Hollande, a choir singing “La
Marseillaise” and a performance of Jacques Brel’s classic pop song “Quand on n’a que
l’amour.”
Though Charlie Hebdo was known for its crass, outspoken satire, and perhaps more for
threats against it prior to the January 7 attacks, it was in reality a niche publication appealing to a
very small group; for example, when compared to left-wing journal Libération’s 170,000
circulation, at its height (“Iconic French newspaper Libération in crisis as editor-in-chief steps
down”), Charlie Hebdo was a small player in French media. Luz, the publication’s lone
surviving cartoonist said « Les médias ont fait une montagne de nos dessins alors qu’au regard
du monde on est … un petit fanzine de lycéen » (Les InRocks). And, as Emmanuel Todd points
out, it was re-launched after the attacks with the financial support of the French government
(Todd, 13) after the magazine failed to gain enough public support to save it from closure. As
has happened everywhere, print-first publications that limit their reach to the distribution of
physical copies have struggled to survive since the rise of social networks and Internet news,
with effectively-adapted business models proving elusive. As social media took hold, Charlie
Hebdo’s reach remained bound to hard copies, with the public favoring publications that played
the social network game, allowing free and immediate access. Why then was this floundering,
marginally popular publication internationally mourned as a martyr for freedom of expression?
Examining the theatrical nature of France’s reactions to these terrorist attacks informs the
answer.

4

III. Spectacle and its interpretations: the #JeSuisCharlie marches
and Hollande’s speech at the memorial ceremony
Artaud’s Le théâtre et son double provides a critical lens for spectacle, and therefore of
these specific ritual scenes of citizens reacting to the attacks. His theory of violence as a visceral,
irresistible act supports the categorization of terrorism as expression, placing it in the category of
spectacle, but outside Western limits of acceptable behavior and of rationality. « J'écris pour
agir » as Voltaire said, summarizes the modern moral distinction between hurting with words
and hurting with physical brutality — an earlier, continental version of “the pen is mightier than
the sword,” highlighting the supremacy and power of rational argumentation. This is exactly the
conflict Artaud effectively highlights: modern man is numb to reality inasmuch as he is
incapable of seeing what is real – the brutality of life, its cruelty, « le langage physique » (54) –
on display in the wordless space of the theater. If the terrorist act is really “Act I” of the play, the
violence jolts us awake to consider this reality. In France and throughout the world, that
awakening primed the masses for action (how effective an action will be addressed in Chapter
IV). In Act II, the #JeSuisCharlie demonstrations, the crowds and their hashtag comrades on
social media responded in Western fashion, and with what Artaud would likely see as causing
the psychic struggle of modern times: language, and rather more problematic, its falsehood.
Sennett defines the shift from emotional presentation to emotional representation – the result of
which Artaud detests – as reacting to a change in belief about human expressivity in an age of
obscured social codes (42): “When a culture shifts from believing in presentation of emotion to
representation of it, so that individual experiences reported accurately come to seem expressive,
then the public man loses a function, and so an identity. As he loses a meaningful identity,
expression itself becomes less and less social.” (Sennett, 102). Absent the structuring social
5

codes of a world of feudal unequals, the supposedly equal people of the modern world are left
without the bearings that would have otherwise anchored and contextualized the meaning of their
expression without the need to remove that feeling from the self. In modern political discourse,
that meaning is neither evident nor objective. The subjectivity of expression and of its
interpretation alters interaction, and creates room for interference and manipulation. In the case
of Charlie and the Bataclan memorial, that manipulation may be interpreted as being imbued
with religious language and even constituting a totalitarian impulse, as I will explain later in this
chapter. Roland Barthes, in Mythologies, emphasizes that mythology itself being a system of
language, “It is therefore by no means confined to oral speech. It can consist of modes of writing
or of representations” (110).
The language of the Charlie crowds and the media covering them, while pointing
specifically and emphatically to Voltaire, and extolling secularism, is in reality full of religious
undertones and meaning. I will demonstrate later in this chapter how this contradiction plays out
in spectacle. And while the marchers and the media condemned the terrorists’ violence, they
used violence as propulsion for their own argument – an “incantation” of the cult of rationality
by the metteur en scène who functions as « une sorte d'ordonnateur magique, un maître de
cérémonies sacrées » (Artaud, 90). This #JeSuisCharlie « communion » (Fourest) honoring
freedom of expression – a clearly modern value – fits Sennett’s definition of secular charisma: “a
rational way to think about politics in a culture ruled by belief in the immediate, the immanent,
the empirical, and rejecting as hypothetical, mystical, or ‘pre-modern’ belief in that which cannot
be directly experienced” (Sennett, 276). Here, the pre-modern coincides with the preRevolutionary period of emotional presentation that Sennett describes. But for #JeSuisCharlie,
secular charisma is paradoxical because while those involved in or reporting on the Republican
6

march made certain allusions to the Enlightenment which demonstrate that participants explicitly
reject the mystical, they subtly and simultaneously use a distinctly religious lexicon to extol
Enlightenment (Republican) values, thus bestowing on them the characteristics and reverence of
religious devotion. The focus on individual experience among the marchers — particularly the
emotional draw of being part of something bigger, connected to something higher like
Revolutionary values — is a mystical impulse antithetical to a protest for laïcité. In the spectacle
of #JeSuisCharlie, the wordlessness was sufficient only for so long before the litany began;
indeed, the words or “masks” that Artaud eschews and that Sennett sees as necessary (35), cover
up the ritual impulses beneath. Todd elucidates: « Les médias communiaient dans la
dénonciation du terrorisme, dans la célébration du caractère admirable du peuple français, dans
la sacralisation de la liberté et de la République. Charlie Hebdo et ses caricatures de Mahomet
étaient sanctuarisés. … Les chaînes de télévision et la presse nous répétaient en boucle que nous
vivions un moment « historique » de communion » (Todd, 11-12). Communion, a gathering and
sharing of intimate spiritual feelings, here underlines the mystical overtones of the media’s
characterization of these public gatherings. Though the media – in reality, a group of many
people from many organizations – may not have been empowered to truly influence the feelings
of individual participants, it at least heavily promoted a singular idea of their motivation in its
coverage and frequently and liberally used religious language like this to describe it. This is
certainly not the first time in French history that the media’s power has surfaced to train a news
story into a divisive narrative affecting national identity: Zola’s polemic J’Accuse ! comes to
mind from the days of the Dreyfus affair.
As we look at that overpowering influence the media had, contextualizing the terrorist
acts and defining the meaning of collective feeling, the question of the identity of the metteur en
7

scène is of utmost importance. Here, Artaud’s theory helps us understand how the wordlessness
of the Republican communion easily lent itself to interpretation. Referring to the Balinese
theater, or what he considers « le théâtre pur », Artaud insists on « la prépondérance absolue du
metteur en scène dont le pouvoir de création élimine les mots. … le foisonnement compliqué de
tous les artifices scéniques qui imposent à notre esprit comme l'idée d'une métaphysique l’idée
d'une utilisation nouvelle du geste et de la voix » (Artaud, 80). Theater according to Artaud
shares with the #JeSuisCharlie gatherings both a yearning for transcendence and an underlying
violence. Sociologist Emmanuel Todd links these characteristics with those whom he considers
the creators of both scenes – the Republican march, and Hollande’s solemn assembly: according
to him participants are “zombie Catholics,” erstwhile anti-Revolutionary Catholic zealots who,
having recently left Catholicism, are prone to displays of religiously-charged, inegalitarian
secularism (Todd, 64) and desperately in need of an ideological foil (65). Using maps of
sociological and economic data of the last century, Todd identifies the most enthusiastic Charlie
supporters (outside of Paris) with those who are also in favor of neoliberal projects like the
Maastricht treaty’s introduction of the Euro – in other words, France’s elite classes and those
who similarly benefit from liberalization. As if providing proof of the state’s explicit sanction of
the march/spectacle, several heads of state appeared in newspapers like Le Monde marching,
apparently (but not really, as explained on page 9), at the head of the emotive crowd. As Sennett
argues, the spontaneity of expression became the hallmark of what moderns yearn for – to feel
something, even vicariously, even in politics. His example of this redemptive expression as a
scandal-ridden Richard Nixon crying over his dog Checkers on a radio broadcast shows the
public’s willingness to worship the “artist” or the politician’s expressive act, rather than look at
his political acts. This is perhaps the nut of modern politics’ most vexing problems, Sennett says:
8

politicians need not be authentic; they must only appear so (Sennett, 281). Political expression is
divorced from political action as the audience is convinced not by real-world action, but by the
emotion conveyed and felt by the subjective individual. This is how, for Charlie marchers and
the world that watched along, the tableau of Angela Merkel et al linking arms, against a
backdrop of a Parisian boulevard that stretches to the horizon, was framed to declare a
universalism that their position and political priorities directly contradicted. Yet this seems not to
matter to those involved in this ritual worship of secularism. As Todd further points out, the
police – traditionally seen as protectors of the status quo – were there, too, revealing « les
objectifs concrets de la manifestation pour atteindre ses valeurs latentes » . While the march
nominally communicated an opposition to violence and a call to peaceful demonstration in the
face of that violence, it included a show of force, presented in a way more palatable to those who
might suspect the motives of the police were impure. Some on Twitter even expressed that on
that day, they liked the police; the implication, of course, is that on other days on se méfie d’eux.
Todd continues : « Il s’agissait avant tout d’affirmer un pouvoir, une domination, objectif atteint
en défilant en masse, derrière son gouvernement et sous le contrôle de sa police » (Todd, 87,
original emphasis). The very character of the metteur en scène is in conflict with the message of
its spectacle: elites under police protection and with sanction of the government march in
apparent solidarity, identifying themselves with the victims despite the enormous power they
wield in the society. Only months later the same police sought to put down protests against
neoliberal-oriented changes to French labor law (see Chrisafis, “Riot police crack down on Paris
protests against labor reform”).
In addition to photos framed to portray heads of state as more in solidarity with crowds
than they actually were, digitally altered photos of the march appeared in newspapers around the
9

world and on social media, each including or excluding certain leaders or groups. Former French
president Nicolas Sarkozy allegedly elbowed his way into the front row of world leaders who
were pictured linking arms (“Sarkozy: comment il a réussi à être sur la photo des chefs d'Etat”).
This, unlike the instance of an Israeli newspaper useing digital editing to delete women leaders in
order to appease conservative groups in Israel (“Israeli newspaper edits out Angela Merkel from
front page on Paris march.”), was not merely a concession to strict social mores. The intent of
those in power to be included in the published depiction of the communion and the deliberate
image-making it constitutes is yet another area in which those in the media exert enormous
power over interpretation of the spectacle. Sennett’s theory on theater explains how this kind of
falsification can be convincing, or at least remain unquestioned. Sennett sees the inversion of the
theater and the city as a degradation of expression in modern times and, certainly, the inversion
causes confusion at the very least; more dangerously, it is prone to deceptions like the doctored
or staged photos of marching presidents. This confusion is perhaps how the spectacle of the
marche Républicaine can encapsulate both the irresistible violence of pre-modern theater and the
wordy, dialogue-driven façade of modern European spectacle: Sennett acknowledges our modern
anxiety about what constitutes the real self — the inner self versus the individual represented and
interpreted then from the outside — while Artaud identifies this conflict as the perversion “pure
theater” (92) rightly excludes; he seems to want to access a time when this anxiety didn’t exist,
and the key to it is the ineffable cruelty of violence. The march used both of these theatrical
methods: the violence of the terrorist attacks wakes up the spectators without words, while the
media’s interpretation of it depends on an established vocabulary and cultural shorthand to
communicate its message. This, according to Barthes is mythology itself: the linguistic sign
becomes the signified of a second semiotic layer embedded within the first (111). There would
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perhaps be no glorious call to arms, no seductive, purpose-affirming violence to write about and
to draw in spectators without the atrocities of the terrorist attacks, so the metteur en scène must
appropriate it. One need not justify the violence that destroyed Charlie Hebdo or terrorized
Parisians at the Bataclan, which the media appropriated, to admit these acts were not isolated
violence, presented in the spectacle: the metteurs en scène have kept other violence – for
example, colonial violence and modern state-waged violence – hidden behind the curtain. When
this “offstage” violence is mentioned, certain media/elites are there to make sure the audience’s
focus is redirected to the stage, to what is currently being depicted, to the recent violence enacted
by terrorists. The message is clear: Islamist violence is the real problem. The emotional
performances and theatrical devices – like the cameras focusing on Hollande’s emotional
response and the singing of La Marseillaise following his speech at the solemn memorial after
the Bataclan attacks – are meant to pull spectators into the communal, emotional fervor.
The writings of secular guerrière and journalist Caroline Fourest are useful as a stand-in
viewpoint emcompassing many arguments presented in the press and on social media after the
Charlie Hebdo attacks, and they appear together in her book, published a year after the attacks.
She has taken it upon herself to speak for what she considers the “real left” of French society –
those who share her particular unequivocal views. Fourest celebrates the #JeSuisCharlie
demonstrations as a triumph of Republican fervor, attacking its doubters and unconsciously
affirming its religious nature. In her emotional missive, or religious sermon, L’Éloge du
Blasphème, she brooks no mention of colonialism – again, it must remain behind the curtain for
the illusion to work on spectators. Her melodramatic description of « les deux gauches » even
goes so far as to impugn anyone who doesn’t confess the faith of Charlie Hebdo, like the “good”
leftists do, as heretics to the Enlightenment: « La gauche communautariste, elle, se méfie des
11

lumières et de son idéal d'émancipation, qu'elle perçoit comme la poursuite d'une « mission
civilisatrice ». Elle s'est bâtie dans le rejet du colonialisme et de l'imaginaire postcolonial, qu'elle
croit voir à l'oeuvre dans tout discours critique ou simplement laïque sur l'islam. Peu importe si
ces discours ne visent que son instrumentalisation haineuse et totalitaire, l'islam reste à ses yeux
la religion du pauvre, du colonisé, du « damné de la terre » » (Fourest, 57). Notice her attack
begins with the accusation that these communitauristes don’t worship Les Lumières. Her denial
of the Revolution’s undeniably deliberate « mission civilisatrice » with its particularly violent
manifestation is not simply myopic, but strategic. The goal is to redirect the spectator to the
immersive power of the stage. She accuses her adversaries of generalizing the way she does. In
the same vein, Olivier Roy, in a book of essays Qui es Daesh ?, Briefly mentions social
conditions as contributors to radicalization, but quickly pivots to reassign the source of violence
singularly to Islam: « Bref, il faut se méfier d’une explication, populaire à « gauche », selon
laquelle l’exclusion sociale et le conflit Israélo-Palestinien radicaliseraient les jeunes » (Morin,
14). From this, it seems the conditions for Muslims in France can have no real bearing on their
disposition to violence, but they are as Muslims inherently violent. Roy uses quotes around the
word « gauche », meaning, not the real left, a view that coincides with Fourest’s. It is perhaps no
coincidence that Emmanuel Todd’s Qui est Charlie ? is titled similarly and that in it, Todd
emphasizes the unfavorable social conditions to which immigrants are relegated by the elite
quest for « une idole monétaire ». He further argues that the march itself is a kind of violence
acted out by the elites against the poor: « Dans le contexte du chômage de masse, d’une
discrimination à l’embauche des jeunes d’origine maghrébine, d’une diabolisation incessante de
l’Islam par des idéologues installés au sommet de la société française, à la télévision comme à
l’Académie, on ne saurait souligner assez la violence rentrée dans la manifestation du 11
12

janvier » (Todd, 87). He turns the the tables on the leftists of Fourest’s ilk and attributes the
problems of terrorist violence to factors emanating from the politics, especially the monetary and
trade policy, of the elite. The same police marching in solidarity with Charlie and celebrating
freedom of expression in 2015 turned on its citizens who came out in protest against neoliberal
labor reform in 2016 (Chrisafis, “Riot police…”). The economic priorities of the police and the
government from which it takes its directives are thus made clear.
The leftist media reaction against Todd’s claims rather openly betrays that the march
represented a religious instinct rather than, as claimed, an englightened rationality, and that
Todd’s observations of their underlying economic motivation struck a nerve. Libération’s May 4,
2015 cover proclaimed his book constituted « Blasphème contre le 11 janvier ». One can only
blaspheme that which is sacred, so Libération’s outrage explicitly attributes qualities of inviolate
sacredness to the 11 January Republican march, to the Republican values it claimed to extol, and
shows the left was enraged at Todd’s assertion. We will address later why the reaction is so
pronounced. Fourest’s « droit absolu au blasphème » it appears, is only for those who blaspheme
religion of others, not the sacred secularism of the state. According to Todd, France’s elites
orchestrated the day’s ritual, and the ordinary French, accepted and repeated the symbols
unconsciously. Here it is worth noting that perhaps Todd goes too far in portraying the elites as a
monolithic entity. Much like the media, the term is a collective one encompassing many people
from varying backgrounds. Logically, it would be not only unfair but more importantly untrue to
say that France’s elites are colluding in some grand scheme. Moreover, to claim the same sheeplike blind faith is simply what moved ordinary French people is condescending at best. While
Barthes’ discussion of mythology is again useful in understanding the response of marchers:
when symbolic (semiotic) systems such as myth is offered for interpretation, “as meaning, the
13

signifier already postulates a reading” (117), Gramsci reaffirms the « the difficulty at any given
time, statically (like fact is at an instantaneous photographic image) the structure » (191), in this
case, the structure that affords elites the potential for crafting a message. However, Todd’s
claims are certainly worth considering for his demonstration of a strong statistical and cultural
connection between Catholics of the past and the marchers of today – a group who do seem to
have replaced zealous Catholicism with zealous Republicanism. Again, the spectacle’s message
contradicts its reality in its yearning for a "revolutionary utopia" (McKenna).
The disconnect can be explained : we may look to René Girard’s Violence and the Sacred
to interpret what Todd observed in the grand spectacle of the march: “As we have seen, the
sacrificial process requires a certain degree of misunderstanding… The celebrants do not and
must not comprehend the true role of the sacrificial act” (Girard, 7, emphasis added). Again, this
is not to say that the French who participated had no idea what was going on, but points to the
obfuscation that occurs when concrete facts are rendered symbolic. Fourest makes the important
point that the satirists perpetrated no physical violence on the Muslim population in its abuse of
the prophet’s image (Fourest, 39), and the distinction, as noted above, is meant to strengthen the
moral and cultural position of Charlie by alluding to Voltaire (Todd, 88; Voltaire, 13). Drawn by
the emotional power of the march’s proferred communion, the crowd believes in the
representation and the reason given for its existence: to defend freedom of expression. Fourest
then, with more religious language, underlines her incredulity at anyone harboring a grudge
against Charlie for its expresssion, its unrelenting depictions of Mahomet even after the attacks:
« « Offensant »? Un Mahomet qui pleure en disant « Je suis Charlie » . Un dessinateur qui écrit au-dessus
du personnage « Tout est pardonné ». Que voulait-il de plus après un tel massacre? Que Charlie s'excuse de
s'être fait tirer dessus ? Qu'ils dessinent à genoux en train d'implorer Mahomet? Avec cette couverture,
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Charlie a tendu l'autre joue et prône le pardon. De façon presque, chrétienne » (39, emphasis added).

Once again, her language is driven by religious notions that bolster Charlie’s moral high ground
in the fight against religion, supposedly in general, but really Islam in particular. If Charlie is, as
Todd posits, the symbol for the broader French society in crisis, then Fourest’s insistence on
Charlie’s own pious, “presque chrétienne” attitude and lack of physical violence, and her
acknowldgement of the severe divides within French society’s political landscape set a scene that
fits Todd’s description of the “religious crisis” itself. It also aligns with what Girard describes as
the impetus for sacrificial violence: “When unappeased, violence seeks and always finds a
surrogate victim… chosen only because it is vulnerable and close at hand” (Girard, 2), “exterior
or marginal individuals, incapable of establishing or sharing the social bonds that link the rest of
the inhabitants. Their status as foreigners or enemies, their servile condition, or simply their age
prevents these future victims from fully integrating themselves into the community” (12). He
clarifies that the victim’s guilt or innocence are less important than the sacrifice’s purpose: for
society “to deflect upon a relatively indifferent victim, a ‘sacrificable’ victim, the violence that
would otherwise be vented on its own members, the people it most desires to protect” (4).
While Fourest’s attacks appear exaggerated, the most troubling aspect of her argument is
her contradictory implications: that 1) Revolutionary values are not racist in themselves and that
2) her faction of France’s left represents the true form of laïcité. This presents a contradiction,
first because, as Abbé Grégoire’s writings explicitly state, cultural assimilation was always the
condition for integration into France’s ideal society of equals (see De la littérature des Nègres);
second, laïcité in France did not operate even in 1905 as it does now (see “Loi de 1905: Yann
Moix vs. Nathalie Kosciusko Morizet”), so those who claim to be purists for laïcité would also
need to accept the original intent of the Loi de 1905. This poses a problem for leftists on
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Fourest’s side, because the Revolution’s demand for cultural assimilation remains in force: those
who we might call “true disciples” of the Revolution such as Fourest, and possibly the marchers
implicity accept the imposition of those conditions on all who desire to be part of the Republic,
or else, remain unequal to the rest of society. If true, then Fourest at best minimizes the
subjection of Muslims who have not met the imagined requirements of cultural assimilation
(which for them is intrinsically linked to religion), allowing them to fall outside the guarantees of
liberté, égalité, fraternité, all in the name of affirming Republican values.
Fourest writes 184 pages in order to protect members of her group from such accusations
– the Charlie Hebdo cartoonists in particular, and the left – her left – more broadly. Her
particular use of Christian motifs, mixed with vague allusions to Enlightenment ideologies,
suggests an audience who responds to both. Her language echoes that of the first Republican
zealot, Robespierre who, unlike Fourest, admits to the need for religion in the Republic, though
he consciously and unabashedly replaced Christianity with “Enlightenment values.” In his
discourse « Sur le rapport des idées religieuses et morales avec les principes républicains et sur
les fêtes nationales, » he does not wholly eschew religion, but transforms Christian ideas to fit
the framework of the Republic for the support of moral behavior, and to appeal to the authority
that binds the people under that of the state; he does not disavow violence, but expects it and
even encourages martyrdom as glorious on behalf of the Republic:
« L’idée de l’Être-Suprême et de l’immortalité de l’âme est un rappel continuel à la justice; elle est donc
sociale et républicaine… Le chef-d’oeuvre de la société serait de créer en lui pour les choses morales un
instinct rapide qui, sans le secours tardif du raisonnement, le portât à faire le bien et à éviter le mal ; car la
raison particulière de chaque homme égaré par ses passions n’est souvent qu’un sophiste qui plaide leur
cause, et l’autorité de l’homme peut toujours être attaquée par l’amour-propre de l’homme. Or, ce qui
produit ou remplace cet instinct précieux, ce qui supplée à l’insuffisance de l’autorité humaine, c’est le
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sentiment religieux qu’imprime dans les âmes l’idée de la sanction donnée aux préceptes de la morale par
une puissance supérieure à l’homme » .

He does not insist upon reason as a motivator to do right, and in fact warns against legislated
atheism. Unlike the post-1905 equivalency of Republican values with atheism, Robespierre
recognized the tendency toward belief among the once-Catholic French, using the language of
Catholicism to convert them to the doctrines of secularism. Alexis de Tocqueville later explained
that contrary to what the French believed about themselves — and I add, especially what they
still believe — their « sortie » from religion didn’t leave them empty of transcendent feeling, but
redirected their faith to « ces sentiments et ces passions [qui] étaient devenus pour eux comme
une religion nouvelle » (Tocqueville, 251). That religion is laïcité, but enough time has passed
since Robespierre’s era that it is no longer new, and it has given birth to its own dogmas. Roger
Chartier explains that the Catholic Reformation regulated and universalized the basic identity of
French Catholics — who until then were all over the map in terms of practice — with “repetition
of the same gestures [that] implanted in everyone a direct awareness of belonging and furnished
vital reference point that lent meaning to the world and existence” (Chartier, 95); similarly the
law of 1905 with its official break from Catholicism and introduction of state-run schools
reformed the French mentality and the gestures of worship in the secular state. Robespierre could
not have done better himself. From this comes the reaction of « la foule », the “zombie
Catholics” of Todd’s definition, who likewise tend to gestures of secular religious fervor, and
whose hostility to and fixation on their intended victim’s religious attachments paradoxically
blinds them to their own religious tendencies.
Fourest, in repeating the victimhood of Charlie’s cartoonists as « des journalistes morts à
cause de leur courage » (Fourest, 35, original emphasis), also taps the power of Artaud’s concept
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of théâtre de la cruauté to underline not only Charlie’s victimhood but its martyrdom for the
cause of blasphemy; she calls to those who will hear the news of it as a call to arms. If Girard is
correct that sacrificial violence must play out, so is Todd, who points out the possible motives –
interestingly, economic – for which French society may need a « bouc émissaire » : he says the
same group (les classes moyennes supérieures) who receives the most from the welfare state
presents itself « désormais, systématiquement, comme victimes d’impôt. Mais cette
représentation en victimes n’exprime en France que le pouvoir idéologique de ces couches
privilégiées » (Todd, 94). The spectacle, once again, reassigns victimhood to divert the
spectator’s attention from the reality of economic circumstances to which the elite class has
exposed France, including those in the banlieues.
The reversed economic victimhood echoes itself socially and explains how the Charlie
crowds can march with total support of the Western world and in company of the country’s most
powerful and still consider themselves the victims. But to a society indoctrinated – by years of
imbibing its own historiography – to glorify a martyr’s death in the name of Republican values,
and yet to which perpetrating explicit violence is forbidden, the more appropriate and more
complex way to sacrifice its victim is to draw upon itself the insupportable violence. It’s a sort of
trap for the outsider whose conscious values are dissimilar, who may even proudly martyr
himself in the process. In reality, secularism functions in France as a religion like Islam — a
belief system aimed at the progress of humanity — but this is not evident in the spectacle’s
recounting of the story. The roles are set, and each character’s performance is staged in a way
that ensures that the other’s (as in, he who does not belong) behavior will be interpreted by the
spectator as the metteur en scène desires. The sacrifice here is split into two parts : victim of
violence (insider scapegoat), and bearer of blame (outsider scapegoat). Guilt is transferred as the
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marginalised other – in this case a radicalized Muslim youth – becomes the sacrificer and the
perpetrator of atrocities on a victim. Hidden from view and perpetrating the illusion that his
violent outburst is not what Girard describes as an unhinged cycle of violence, is the violence
perpetrated against Muslims in France and abroad by Western forces. These forces need not
necessarily be military, as Todd points out (87): they often manifest within Europe as economic
and societal rejection, oppression and isolation. Once again, the maneuvers of Fourest’s left to
diminish these facts of life for a Muslim in France operate to present Muslim violence as
expected, though condemnable. When an outsider scapegoat commits violence, perhaps drawn to
a similar transcendent purpose as the Republican marchers unknowingly were, the sacrifice can
be completed, and the powerful of the group can remain untouched by the violence it publicly
loathes and from which it privately might gain so much. Guilt is expunged, someone else has
perpetrated the violence of the blood sacrifice and is therefore to blame for its execution, and a
unified society rallies to decry the depravity of violence and hail and reaffirm its own superior
values. The outsider scapegoat who ceded to the temptation of violence remains beneath the
sacrificer-metteur en scène culturally, and may rightly be considered a threat — a perfect foil for
une prise de pouvoir. Thus, the powerful need not stain their own hands with blood, but are able
to use the insider victim as a symbol to engage the wrath of the wider society toward the outsider
scapegoat while exerting apparently heroic force upon him. According to Girard, unsanctioned
violence will not satisfy the need for a transcendental sacrifice, but will lead to an unending
cycle of violence (24). Unfortunately, it is a cycle that renders real rhetorical and political capital
to elites, who are therefore unlikely to end it. (Elites again are mentioned here in general terms.
Just like the marchers, it would be unwise and unfair to paint them as a unified, colluding group
with no dissenters and no interior conflict on the part of some. Nor is such a monolith necessary
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for the scapegoating to function as described here : a cultural habit, or mythology, combined
with self interest is enough to push upon the society to produce the result.) Once again the elites
control the message by controlling the visibility of previous violence for which the terrorist
attacks might be retributive 2. The upper middle classes, in this case, are able to enact their
designs not only on the cartoonists of a marginal, not very popular magazine, but also on the
lower classes of immigrants who then must apologize — or perhaps repent — for the unhinged
violence of one of their own and renounce their beliefs and even convert to prove their penitence.
Al Jazeera reported that shortly after the attacks, the police began unprecedented punitive raids
on Muslim neighborhoods, while people, even drunk people, were given prison time for
expressing favor for the terrorists (“French dissenters jailed after crackdown on speech that
glorifies terrorism”). To the French, it might merely appear to be a paternalistic gifle on the
cheek of the Muslim community as the state tries to show the rest of its citizens it is dealing with
the « troublemakers » (see Carroll). Or, it shows Todd’s claim to be true — that underneath the
fanatic Republicanism that Fourest espouses lie vestiges of Vichy: the state and its police appear
eager to act out violence on marginalized groups, eager to control or suppress rather than
celebrate or even allow free expression, suggesting a totalitarian impulse. Now, the apparatus is
different from Vichy France. It has become more complex and less direct, but a critical
evaluation will reveal that unfortunately it functions to the same end. This power grab is the
endnote in the sacrifical process and is possible because of the imitative ritual-spectacle
surrounding it, cloaking the intention of the metteur en scène.

2

An article in socialist magazine Jacobin points to U.S. atrocities abroad as incitement for
terrorist violence. Similar situations can be extrapolated to the violence other Western countries
like France enact or support beyond it borders (Marcetic).
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The coordinated terrorist attacks in November continued the spectacle. Initiated once
again by visceral acts of violence, this time of a greater scale; the terrorists remained in the mise
en scène of Charlie’s choosing and of symbolic importance therefore to both groups : along the
route of the Marche Républicaine down the Boulevard Voltaire, and targeting the Bataclan
theater (supposedly for the reason that the then-owners were Jewish Israel-supporters 3) and
Comptoir Voltaire. Given the ritual, incantatory nature of the 11 January march, the new stages
may be characterized sacred spaces — one, a site of ritual and communion for the marchers, the
other named after a saint of secular France whose name was repeated throughout the march.
Fourest again provides an insight to the mentality of those who are really Charlie, and why we
should consider the location a sacred symbol as she describes the scene of the Marche
Républicaine on the street where the later violence was focused. She describes the candlelit
gathering with a subtle image of a Pietà : « Il y a des millions d’êtres prêts à prendre mes
camarades dans leur bras », she says, referring to the murdered cartoonists. She continues,
calling the march « une communion nationale » where marchers were « réchauffés par cette
fraternité » and where some appeared as if in a Delacroix painting. « Aux pieds des monuments,
d’autres bougies brûlent d’une lumière tranquille. …On chante la fraternité. …La tête de du
cortège glisse lentement sur le boulevard Voltaire » (Fourest, 12, emphasis added). Here, the
stage of the spectacle is tranformed into a cathedral with candles, hymns, and the light of a
transcendent connection shone on the believers who had come to say « Merci Charlie » (Fourest,
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The Times of Israel reported the Bataclan had been owned by pro-Jewish activists for 40 years
and was sold just two months before the attacks. (“Jewish owners recently sold Paris’s Bataclan
theater, where IS killed dozens”)
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13) in recognition of his sacrifice so that all might have freedom expression. Those who
understand Christian ritual will immediately see the parallels in Fourest’s description of this
place — a place the Bataclan attackers chose in advance. I propose this as evidence that the
Bataclan violence, too, was to the terrorists retribution rather than mysteriously motivated
Islamic violence. And it was targeted to defile what to the French secularist so obviously became
a sacred site.
In light of the importance of ritual sacrifice in general and Girard’s comment that the age
or vulnerability of the victim plays a part, it’s perhaps no surprise that President Hollande’s
speech at the memorial focused on the innocence of the victims of the November Bataclan
attacks. He characterized the attack as targeting the younger generation’s love for freedom as
expressed in their nightlife habits that were obliterated by the terrorists : death metal, alcohol and
smoking in cafes, dancing, sex — all forbidden in Islam. The speech directs the audience toward
a notion that, similar to the chants of Americans after 9/11, the terrorists hate us because we’re
free. The motivations of the terrorists, however reprehensible they are in reality, are reduced to
fanatical lunacy and worse, jealously toward the superior way of life the French and other
Westerners enjoy. But in an essay in Qui est Daech ?, Michel Foucher candidly notes the
initiation a few weeks before of French involvement in a Western coalition in Iraq and Syria, as
well as military presence in Jordan and the United Arab Emirates (77). This happened between
spectacles, or perhaps during their intermission, and particularly because it went
unacknowledged behind the curtain, offstage, did indeed affect the country’s interpretation of the
terrorist violence. Hiding Western violence is crucial to the spectacle’s success as an illusion, as
we’ve seen. The devices for misdirection in the Bataclan memorial ceremony and particularly in
Hollande’s Invalides speech, continue the repetitive ritual language of the Republican march, but
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include more explicit references to the intentions of the state as concerns the security of its
borders and its citizens.
A comparison of Hollande’s two speeches — his initial speech the night of the shootings
and his longer speech at the memorial at Invalides (“Hommage national: Texte intégral du
discours de François Hollande” 4) — help us recognize the devices that contribute to the
maintenance of the spectacle and its illusion. The first speech the night of the attacks was simple,
as events had not yet resolved and police were still apprehending the terrorists — Paris was in
chaos. His demeanor was calm and his message clear. After a brief mention of terrorist attacks,
he moved straight into talk of security, announced perfunctorily the state of emergency and
closing of the borders, then in an uptick, moved on to the need for solidarity and compassion (I
paraphrase): France must be united, its authorities firm. France must be great. We are still
securing Paris. Trust that we can protect the nation. Long live the République and long live
France. It seems the goals of the government are laid bare in Hollande’s demand that the
populace trust in the state to protect them.
Perhaps the more interesting aspect of Hollande’s formal speech as compared to the
#JeSuisCharlie demonstrations is the displacement of the citizen as principal “actor.” In the
more formal “solemn ceremony” this time, the state played a preeminent role, with President
François Hollande’s speech at center stage, the cameras waiting for an emotional reaction and
the violent Marseillaise entoned. The role of actor was now fully occupied by the state, who is
once again the metteur en scène. It’s as if Hollande had time to hone his message, embedding the
rationale for indefinite extraordinary security measures into the speech. It’s fair to restate here
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No page or line numbers available on this online text.
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that Hollande need not be painted a villain, as Sennett says: he, too is convinced of the message.
Where #JeSuisCharlie was about citizen communion, Hollande’s speech was his moment to
profess the faith in an official setting — Les Invalides. It is worth noting Les Invalides’ historic
connection to Louis XIV and later to Napoleon, as a healing place for their soldiers wounded for
France’s sake during the defense and expansion of France. So, too, the wounded nation mourns
its dead at the hands of terrorists, and seeks healing in a ritual-spectacle staged at Les Invalides.
Sennett explains that the “politics of personality consists of the revelation of intentions unrelated
to the world of action… it is of necessity an illusion in that the facts of the politician’s increasing
power are being obscured by his professed motives, but he practices the illusion on himself as
well as on his listeners” (281). In the modern world in psychic crisis, he says, inaccessible
transcendent feeling is easily replaced with any feeling at all. In France, the president of la
Republique laïque gave a speech laced with Christian language to decry religious violence,
religious war, against the nation. The speech’s crescendo transfers godlike qualities of
benevolence, power and authority to the state to justify undefined security measures for an
indefinite period of time — neatly echoeing Robespierre. In addition to the chosen mise en scène
and the official dialogue, it is important to emphasize the effect of the props, costumes and
musical accompaniment which attempt to give the spectacle visual and aural power and yet
betray a mystical sensibility. The following is not the complete text of Hollande’s speech, but a
collection of excerpts that contain the most striking religious language. I will highlight the
religiously coded words in italics and follow each paragraph or section with comments :
« Vendredi 13 novembre, ce jour que nous n’oublierons jamais, la France a été frappée
lâchement, dans un acte de guerre organisé de loin et froidement exécuté. Une horde d’assassins
a tué 130 des nôtres et en a blessé des centaines, au nom d’une cause folle et d’un dieu trahi » .
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Hollande, having the principal role in the spectacle, interprets and contextualizes the actions of
the terrorists vis à vis their own professed faith, referring to them with the primitive « horde »,
and attributing their actions to madness. The official narrative overpowers and appropriates the
events themselves. Again, the reverse victimhood is emphasized with the suggestion that God
was not only displeased with violence against the French, but betrayed by these members of a
false religion, or at least, false members of a religion, though the idea that a person’s life can be
animated or driven by religion in modern France is enough to bring ridicule 5. He is sure to
emphasize that the terrorists were not « les nôtres », clearly falling outside the belonging and
communal feeling he celebrates right now, and incidentally outside the group for which the bouc
emissaire is expunging internal violence, according to Girard’s theory.
« C’est parce qu’ils étaient la France qu’ils ont été abattus. C’est parce qu’ils étaient la
liberté qu’ils ont été massacrés ». Here the victims were rendered into saints and symbols of the
Republic. It’s something the Charlie Hebdo cartoonists would have hated, according to one of
only two of the magazine’s surviving staff, Luz. He reasons that turning Charlie into symbols is
exactly against the magazine’s goals, but cynical politicians would profit and gain momentum
for their causes (“Luz : ‘Tout le monde nous regarde, on est devenu des symboles”). As he
clarifies, « ce sont des gens qui ont été assassinés, pas la liberté d’expression ! » (emphasis
added) or, in the case of Bataclan, people not France. More precisely, these people are being
converted through Hollande’s speech — a sort of beatification ceremony — into saints martyred
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In an exchange with a French friend on social media, I asked her why she posted a meme
protesting French supermarket chain Franprix’s introduction of Hallal meat products. I pointed
out that Hallal requires the animals be treated better and butchered more humanely, so what does
it matter if they do it for religion? She answered that humane treatment of animals is good, but
we shouldn’t do it for religion. Religion, she says, shouldn’t be forced onto our plates.
25

for the cause of the Republic. Note how he equates France itself with the very essence of liberté :
the victims are France are liberty.
Next, Hollande portrays France and « ses forces » as a Christ figure, healing the sick and
bringing peace to the wounded victims : « la France sera à vos côtés. Nous rassemblerons nos
forces pour apaiser les douleurs et après avoir enterré les morts, il nous reviendra de « réparer »
les vivants ». Just as Christ’s resurrection brought him back to heal, so France will rebound from
this to heal survivors, and more importantly, return in glory and power. Here he seems to be
preparing the spectators to expect and accept a show of power on the part of the state, and to
connect it in their minds to the notion it’s the saving they need, even a transcendence for which
they yearn.
« Beaucoup [des victimes], je le sais, avaient tenu à manifester le 11 janvier, comme des
millions de Français. Ils avaient dit leur refus de céder face à la menace terroriste. Ils savaient
que la France n’est l’ennemie d’aucun peuple, que ses soldats se portent là où on les appelle,
pour protéger les plus faibles et non pour assouvir une quelconque domination ». He begins by
linking the victims to what the audience undoubtedly will remember as a poignant, sacred
gathering as previously discussed: the January 11 Republican March. If it was indeed a
communion, then the victims were practicing laïques or croyants. Much like Abbé Grégoire’s
affirmation that other races need only be properly inculturated to be equal with the French and
included in the Republic (“De la littérature de nègres,” 6, 82), or Clermont-Tonnerre’s famous
« Il faut tout refuser aux Juifs comme nation et accorder tout aux Juifs comme individus, » the
unity comes not from denial or exclusion of one or another group as such, as much as in their
denying themselves of any affection they may have for other “gods.” They must convert.
Hollande then underlines the innocence of France, with a comment that specifically ignores
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France’s violent colonial past and even its government’s more recent complicity with Nazi
Germany. It even seems Hollande is responding directly to Todd’s accusation that the
Republican March was in itself a show of power meant to manifest une domination.
Then, channeling the power of spectacle in the modern era, Hollande makes a sort of
mise en abime that focuses his spectacle on the expressive power of musical artists and sports
stars so prone to worship, its importance as a tool of solidarity and resistance, and its symbolic
power to unify France: « Parmi les victimes du Bataclan, beaucoup avaient fait de la musique
leur métier. C’est cette musique qui était insupportable aux terroristes. C’est cette harmonie
qu’ils voulaient casser, briser. C’est cette joie qu’ils voulaient ensevelir dans le fracas de leurs
bombes. Et bien, ils ne l’arrêteront pas. Et comme pour mieux leur répondre, nous multiplierons
les chansons, les concerts, les spectacles; nous continuerons à aller dans les stades, et notamment
au Stade si bien nommé, le Stade de France à Saint-Denis. Nous participerons aux grands
rendez-vous sportifs, comme aux rencontres les plus modestes, et nous pourrons aussi
communier dans les mêmes émotions, en faisant fi de nos différences, de nos origines, de nos
couleurs, de nos convictions, de nos croyances, de nos confessions, car nous sommes une seule
et même Nation, portés par les mêmes valeurs » . Though the comment that the music was
« insupportable aux terrorists » appears absurd, it serves to place them and their kind outside of
the cultural milieu of the French. Again, what matters is not the actual religion or any other
difference between Frenchmen, but that these ideas and spectacles create in all who claim
Frenchness les mêmes émotions. Clearly, the emotional power of these spectacles, songs, and
sports, appears universal because emotion itself is universal. Rhetorically, Hollande uses the
beseiged “spectacles” — the rock concert at the Bataclan and the soccer game at the Stade de
France, for example — as stand-ins for the emotional or mystical heights people feel viewing
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them. He then transmutes that worship of sports and music stars to the worship of the Republican
values that similarly elicit a conditioned emotional response. He places the attribution of
sacredness to any other thing outside the very definition of a good French laïc. He ends on a note
of unity of values, and by values he means Republican values, or more prescisely, the
contemporary left’s understanding of those values — the only valid ideals in the Republic.
He then once again acts as interpretor of meaning of the horrific violence, which
comment itself is a perfect example of the kind of explanation required, in Girard’s theory of
internal violence assuaged by terrorist attack that unites the group, to turn the violence to the
benefit of the group: « Que veulent les terroristes? Nous diviser, nous opposer, nous jeter les uns
contre les autres. Je vous l’assure, ils échoueront. Ils ont le culte de la mort, mais nous, nous,
nous avons l’amour, l’amour de la vie ».
Hidden somewhat in the very middle of the speech, and surrounded with sacred secular
sentiment before and after, the justification for vague, seemingly unlimited expansion of
government power appears: « Nous pouvons compter sur le Parlement pour adopter toutes les
mesures qu’appelle la défense des intérêts du pays, dans un esprit de concorde nationale, et dans
le respect des libertés fondamentales. Et puis, et puis surtout, nous pouvons compter sur chaque
Française et sur chaque Français pour faire preuve de vigilance, de résolution, d’humanité, de
dignité ». In light of the arrests of anyone vocalizing solidarity of sentiment with the terrorists of
the Charlie Hebdo attacks months before and the severe prison sentences given even to drunk
people mouthing off stream of consciousness ramblings at police (“French dissenters jailed after
crackdown on speech that glorifies terrorism”), it appears a disingenuous comment. His
emphasis on relying on citizens to be on the lookout for whatever might be against « les interêts
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du pays » (a vague notion) seems a gesture to ensure a feeling of solidarity and inclusion for
those who believe in the Republic.
He then swears before the people, commending them for their faithful practice of laïcité,
swearing before all that France will continue the path of martyrdom, and commending the acts of
devotion to the Republic: « Je vous l’affirme ici: nous ne changerons pas; nous serons unis, unis
sur l’essentiel. Et je salue, ici, devant vous, familles, ces innombrables gestes de tant de Français
anonymes qui se sont pressés sur les lieux des drames pour allumer une bougie, déposer un
bouquet, laisser un message, apporter un dessin. Et si l’on cherche un mot pour qualifier cet
élan, ce mot existe dans la devise de la République: c’est la fraternité ». The props in this part of
the spectacle are highly symbolic and religious as well. Notably, among tokens one might
recognize for use in religious ceremony or as offerings on an altar, drawings are mentioned. If
we take Hollande’s list as a sort of inventory of now acceptable offerings in the practice of
laïcité, the drawings that became symbolic during the #JeSuisCharlie marches finish the list and
reaffirm the march as a sacred event for laïcs – an event of which Hollande made mention after
Bataclan presicely because it reminded his spectators of the emotion they felt communing en
deuil for Charlie’s cartoonists. In January, the pencil and paper became like relics of the
martyred cartoonists, and Hollande’s speech uses their symbolic power.
« Le patriotisme que nous voyons aujourd’hui se manifester, avec ces drapeaux fièrement
arborés, ces rassemblements spontanés, ces foules qui chantent la Marseillaise; tout cela n’a rien
à voir avec je ne sais quel instinct de revanche ou je ne sais quel rejet de l’autre. … la
France garde intacte, malgré le drame, malgré le sang versé, ses principes d’espérance et de
tolerance ». The supposed spontaneity of the crowds singing the Marsaillaise is somewhat
undone by its performance following Hollande’s speech, all arranged by his government with a
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few weeks of planning between when the attacks occurred and when the solemn memorial took
place. It bears repeating that the unity and hope that France felt occurred because of, not in spite
of, « le drame » et « le sang versé » . The sacrificial cycle requires it, and Hollande, in a rather
cynical falsehood, obscures it.
Slate.fr had Hollande’s speech set up for users to easily tweet short quotes (“Hommage
national: le texte intégral du discours de Francois Hollande”), which brings us to an important
phenomenon on which this sort of cynical maneuver relies: the very nature of social media as a
polarizing, symbol-forging medium prone to self-deceiving performance that creates yet another
type of mise en abime in the spectacle. Before we tackle certain uses of social media and how it
extends the illusions we’ve discussed, a discussion of the power structures that underlie French
society, including its economic realities and its colonial past might be useful. Of particular
interest to discussing expression is the position of believers in French society, and how French
Muslims’s double “otherness” distorts the real-world meaning for them of the Republic’s
grandiose promises of liberty, equality and fraternity.
IV. Power structures behind the curtain : economics, laïcité, otherness
When we discuss Tartuffe, we see Louis XIV and Colbert. Here too, the social context of
the production affects the spectacle’s meaning and therefore bears exploration, even briefly. I
mean to explore specifically the interwoven existence of economic, social and religious power
structures in French society that restrict expression for some, uphold the assumptions of the
spectators, and make the narrative’s amplification on social media both possible and profitable.
These economic and social power structures are interwoven, which in turn drives how the
spectacle plays on social media and with its users in the West.
Economic power
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The commonality between today’s self-proclaimed defenders of Enlightenment values
and the bourgeois sections of French society has long existed. One of the principal critiques
Todd makes of the Charlie demonstrators is their association with the middle and upper classes
whose economic interests are at the heart of their unconscious — or one might argue, conscious
and simply rational — motives. The middle and upper classes of 18th century French society
were as eager to disguise their true motives of economic interest as is that sector of society today,
and the ideals of the Enlightenment (and of the Revolution) to which the Charlie crowd claims
heritage are purposely placed at center stage to obscure the reality of France’s history (of which
Hollande is notably proud) and its current economic stratification (see Frémeaux). Here, in this
chapter, I intend to show that the habit of proclaiming and even worshipping Republican values
is a performance to obscure the economic, historical, and political realities that directly
marginilize the kinds of groups that are vulnerable to radicalization (see Chrisafis, “Charlie
Hebdo attackers : born, raised and radicalised in Paris”).
In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Jürgen Habermass outlines the
legal aspect of the modern state: it was formed not to proclaim and engender equality (as the
Revolutionary ideology claims), but to protect the interests of bourgeois liberalism (77).
Liberalization of laws in regards to relative equality among market actors, and freedom to
dispose of their property, work, wages, etc., as they please was established at the Revolution with
abolishment of prior controls. The modern state was formed not to interfere with the
market/bourgeois interests (79), and exists essentially to protect capital. To illustrate the link to
today’s bourgeois, Todd correlates the Charlie marchers with the regions that voted in favor of
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and ten years later in 2002 the introduction of the Euro, which
opened France to liberalization, diminishing the state’s ability to direct its own monetary policy.
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“The turnout was again around 70% but the treaty was rejected by 54.67% of French voters”
(Frémeaux, 76). Where the January 11 march was most widely attended (aside from Paris) Todd
points out that this overlaps with heavily Catholic areas that resisted the Revolution initially,
were historically anti-Dreyfussard and later became Vichiste strongholds. Economic
liberalization coincides with the Maastricht treaty of 1992, and “the decline of inequality
observed during the 1980s has been canceled by an increase since the end of the 1990s. The
rapid growth of capital income is the main cause of this recent increase” (Frémeaux, 8). This
structure exists by design, according to Habermass, since it is by and for the bourgeois that laws
affecting wealth were established after the Revolution (80), and of course these laws affect the
lower classes as well.
The liberalized rules at the time of the Revolution and the general restructuring of the
public sphere that Habermass shows, opened and intensified the already rich trade in colonial
slave labor and goods. In The French Atlantic Triangle Christopher Miller points out that the
slave trade provided the wealth that freed the merchant class to be “cultivated,” to read Voltaire,
to “decorate their shelves with the works of the Enlightenment, and perhaps even to read them,”
to forget the source of their wealth and engage with French high culture (62). Miller goes on to
explore what, if they read les Lumières, may have posed moral questions for those in the slave
trade. Voltaire and Montesquieu in particular — both of whose economic interests were
entangled in the slave trade to differing degrees — with levity and irony opened the French mind
to question the validity of slavery. But their criticism was not so straightforward as to simply
condemn the practice. Miller points out that in Lettres Persanes, Montesquieu attacks the
prevailing justifications for slavery, but two pages later claims that it’s natural in certain
climates, such as those of the global south — effectively excluding the possibility of slavery –
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metaphorical or real — being justified on or among Europeans, and leaves the door open to its
justification outside of Europe (66-67); French interests were thereby ideologically protected
from critique. Slavery was absent from the French view in part to shield it from interference.
This invisibility of the slave trade to Europeans then provides a lens for the invisibility of the
arms trade and war profiteering of today. Miller continues his analysis with Voltaire, who
likewise deflects society’s (or spectators’) gaze away from French imperialism and toward the
flawed Spanish conquest of Peru, without ever questioning the validity of imperialism itself —
European Christians undoubtedly had the right to rule 6 (73). Fourest, in Éloge du Blasphème
indulges in this convenient and familiar misdirection when faced with moral questions
concerning the Republic’s colonial past: she responds praising Charlie’s « lutte en solidarité
avec les blasphémateurs, les féministes, les athées et les homosexuels persécutes en Afghanistan,
au Pakistan, au Maghreb, en Iran, en Arabie Saoudite ou en Syrie » (56): Western violence must
remain cloaked. To Fourest, violence emanates only from Muslim countries, or perhaps, from
Muslimness when encountered in France. The absence of any mention of violence by the French
state is absolutely intentional and essential to the spectacle’s message being received as intended.
That spectacle — of mourning the victims at the Marche Républicaine and at Les Invalides — in
addition to becoming immediately symbolic as discussed earlier, depends heavily on the power
found in victimhood, particularly when violence is perpetrated on innocents, and particularly in
France where violence is, like the slave trade, unacceptable within its borders but profit-yielding

6

This is a belief that has remained intact in a contemporary global capitalism rebranded,
exchanging outright conquest for benevolent militarism and “nation-building,” the right to which
Noam Chomsky repeatedly cites as remaining fundamentally unquestioned among Westerners,
for example in the U.S. during the Viet Nam War (Chomsky, 107).
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elsewhere (see Ball, “Arms sales becoming France’s new El Dorado, but at what cost?”).
Europeans can in the Charlie Hebdo attacks and other terrorist violence see themselves as
victims precisely because Western violence toward non-Western people is hidden or minimized:
terrorist violence is de-contextualized and rendered symbolic, portrayed as though all of Western
civilization were brutally victimized while unarmed, or as were the Charlie Hebdo cartoonists,
merely armed with a humble and innocuous pen and paper. The Western victims of terrorist
violence, individually innocent, are also victims of Western complicity in the ongoing economic
and military pursuits that enrich the West at the cost of non-Western lives. This all goes on away
from the stage – largely because media acts as a filter, or reflection, of the society whose
narrative it tells. Exemplifying this notion is Fourest, the « journaliste-guerrière » who insists in
her defense of Charlie Hebdo that its dead cartoonist are and should be the focus of discussion.
Clearly this victimhood is irresistible – a martyrdom by extremists. To her, colonial victimization
is imaginary « dans ce climat de guerre – dû au terrorisme » (Fourest, 67, emphasis added),
which makes the terrorists simply provocateurs. The war they wage, according to her, has
nothing to do with the moral character or history of France as a nation and everything to do with
the evils inherent in Islam.
But here, too, Todd counters this idea :
« La focalisation sur l’Islam révèle en réalité un besoin pathologique des couches moyennes et supérieures
de détester quelque chose ou quelqu’un, et non pas simplement la peur d’une menace montant des basfonds de la société. … Les classes moyennes et supérieures cherchent leur bouc émissaire » (17).

Sacrifice not only uses these hidden power structures; it needs them. The group in power
is by definition that which needs and finds a sacrifical victim, and it is due to the group’s access
to power that completion of the sacrifice, and as we’ve discussed, its obfuscation, is possible.
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Laïcité and otherness
Charlie may have come to symbolize all freedom of expression, but on closer
examination, this implies that it is a model for what constitutes valid freedom of expression in
the Republic. Laïcité, though it claims to proffer neutrality vis à vis religious expression, in
effect prioritizes expression that is irreligious or anti-religious – meaning, expression by the
irreligious or anti-religious. Since 1905, the secular dogma has only intensified. In a segment of
« On n’est pas couché » debating the burkini’s legal status, presenter Yann Moix reads from
Article II of the 1905 law, underlining that its language places the state « dans l’incapacité de
reconnaître aucun culte ». He goes on to cite the rapporteur de la loi, Aristide Briand, explaining
the law’s intent is that the state officially view religious articles of clothing as « un vêtement
comme un autre » void of any symbolic power (“Loi de 1905: Yann Moix VS Nathalie
Kosciusko Morizet”). This is not in reality how the state functions. If anything, its efforts to
combat the use of religious clothing has led the state to affirm rather than neutralize their
symbolic power, which converts the state itself into an adversarial believer in the power of
religious symbols. Believers therefore come into public expression in France at a disadvantage, a
fact that the spectacle both denies and exploits. Because the validity of expression depends on
who is speaking, in order to examine power as it relates to laïcité and its definition of what is
acceptable expression, we must examine otherness: exactly who is included and allowed to
express freely?
« Voltaire a souvent été évoqué par Charlie comme référence doctrinale, tout comme il
l’était, avec raison, pour les révolutionnaires de 1789 ou par les partisans de la séparation de
l’Église et de l’État en 1905 » (Todd, 88). Here, Todd seems to describe the progression of
laïcité from Voltaire’s insolent mockery of religion, to the Revolutionaries’ violent wresting of
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power (and wealth) from the Church, to the adoption of atheism as the standard of Frenchness,
even a state religion, in 1905. In line with Voltaire’s reasoning that the dominant religion should
by no means cede priority of place to others, the dominance of laïcité and its interdependence
with the state so closely mimics the position of the pre-Revolutionary Catholic Church, it
veritably takes its place. Rather than claiming authority from God, « les laïcs » as Fourest calls
her in-group, Charlie claims reference to Voltaire. This leaves room to qualify who is a real laïc
and who is an “other” and is problematic for both practicing laïcs and religious beleivers, but
also presents problems of consistency in applying Voltaire’s ideas in practice.
Speaking of intolerance, of which both groups accuse the other, Voltaire states : « Le
droit de l’intolérance est donc absurde et barbare: c’est le droit des tigres, et il est bien horrible,
car les tigres ne déchirent que pour manger, et nous nous sommes exterminés pour des
paragraphes » (13). Again, the disdain for violence in response to words is emphasized, to the
empowerment of the Charlie crowd. The focus, particularly as promoted in media following
Charlie, has been to ask if the terrorists are intolerant vis à vis Voltaire’s standard. But is Charlie
intolerant? Voltaire proclaims, « si vous disiez que c’est un crime de ne pas croire à la religion
dominante, vous accuseriez donc vous-même les premiers chrétiens vos pères, et vous justifieriez
ceux que vous accusez de les avoir livrés aux supplices » (21). If laïcité is the dominant religion,
its adherents are culpable of demanding conversion to the cause of blasphemy. Todd comments:
« Les journalistes politiques ne se contentaient pas d’écouter les imams et les Français musulmans de base
qui leur affirmaient, comme tout le monde, que la violence était inacceptable, que les terroristes étaient
infâmes et qu’ils trahissaient leur religion. Les journalistes exigeaient d’eux, comme de nous tous, qu’ils
prononcent la formule rituelle, « Je suis Charlie », désormais synonyme de « Je suis français ». Il leur
fallait, pour être pleinement intégrés à la communauté nationale, admettre que le blasphème par des

36

caricatures de Mahomet étaient une composante de l’identité française. On devait blasphémer. … être
français c’était, non pas avoir le droit, mais le devoir de blasphémer. Voltaire dixit » (Todd, 12-13).

Todd makes the important distinction, however, that Voltaire « au contraire de Charlie, ne
dénonçait pas la religion des autres. Il blasphémait la sienne, et sur celle dont il était issu ». In
Todd’s blasphemy on the “real” gauche, only one blasphemy (Charlie’s) is acceptable.
Fourest only proves Todd’s claim in her criticism of anyone unwilling to utter devotion to
Charlie and the blasphemy it represents : « Vrais dévots, ces faux Charlie se sont tus une

semaine, puis ont repris là où ils en étaient. Après avoir feint d'être un peu Charlie au
lendemain du massacre, ils ne l'étaient plus du tout lorsque Luz a dessiné un Mahomet en
train de pleurer et qui, lui, était vraiment Charlie » (39, emphasis added). Here, she establishes
a sort of chatechism for laïcité, accusing even the French de gauche of being secretly « dévots ».
Luz, she claims, is what a good laïc, a good French person, looks like. If, as Chartier claims,
“unifying gestures” implant a sense of belonging, then their absence, whether from abstaining
from using them or not beleiving in them, implies otherness. This binary is not new in France;
from the Enlightenment to the Revolution to l’Affaire Dreyfuss, the tension over what exactly
makes a person acceptably French, what degree of devotion to laïcité is sufficient has led even to
violence. The hijab in public schools is merely a more recent example (see Scott) that resulted in
a long discussion and even in official reports of what constitutes proper practice of laïcité and
therefore what is expected of a true citizen of the Republic. The controversy laid bare both the
weight afforded to differentiating who is performing the expressive act, and the privileging of the
greater society to interpret its meaning rather than the person expressing — even of something as
otherwise inconsequential as a woman’s hair accessory.
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In The Politics of the Veil, Joan Wallach Scott explains that “the law [banning the veil in
public schools] insisted on the unacceptable difference (the ‘otherness’) of those whose
personal/religious identity was achieved by wearing the hijab, even though these girls did not
seek to impose their beliefs on their schoolmates but simply insisted that they themselves could
not dress in any other way without a loss of their sense of identity” (Scott, 93). The viewpoint of
the girl or woman wearing the veil is overpowered by French laïc anxiety about identity and
belonging — perhaps a holdover from the calculated homogenization of France at the Revolution
and its accompanying violence. According to Scott, the justification was supposedly the role
public school plays as unifier of a previously regionalized, compartmentalized France:
“[The ban] was defined above all as a defense of ‘laïcité,’ ‘the cornerstone’ of French republicanism, the
principle that clearly separated church from state. Headscarves were deemed an intrusion of religion into
the sacred secular space of the schoolroom, the crucible in which French citizens are formed …
‘Etymologically,’ began the National Assembly report (Secularism and Schools), ‘laïcité designates the
laos, the people considered as an indivisible whole.’ Although the report conceded that the private rights of
individual conscience must be respected and that the neutrality of the state must be maintained in relation to
the diversity of religious beliefs among its population, these could not outweigh considerations of national
unity. In any contest between individual rights and state sovereignty, the interests of the state must prevail.”
(90, emphasis added).

In any conflict between a religious individual’s expressive rights and state anxiety, the
state privileges laïcité in the name of unity. In addition to being an imitative religious desire, the
yearning for communion and unity is one of convenience to the state: it handily justifies limits on
freedom of expression and increased surveillance (see “Paris attacks: from solidarity to
surveillance”) and even adding protective glass walls around the Eiffel Tower. (The result,
however, of the state’s proclaimed motive is just the opposite: the non-European religious subset
38

of the population is barred from integrating fully unless it converts from one religion to another
— Islam to laïcité. For Muslims, this rigid ideology of laïcité — not day-to-day life in Europe —
presents an impossible problem. They are made to play the part of “the other” or convert under
duress, to display a physical manifestation of devotion. The power imbalances that carry Charlie
Hebdo’s satire beyond the traditional — what Doonesbury’s Garry Trudeau called “punching
downward” (“The Abuse of Satire”) — stand out, as elements of the powerful and privileged
sector of society, knowingly or not, bear down on a population that is disenfranchised and
impoverished. The impossibility of belonging to the kind of overarching purpose and community
the Charlie marchers reveled in provides fertile ground for radicalization, breeding terrorism,
and producing more tension.
Luz explains that while Charlie Hebdo’s cartoonists had no intention of commenting on
or becoming involved in geopolitical issues surrounding their Mohamet drawings, they kept the
magazine offline and catered to high schoolers. That the drawings found their way to the web to
inflame potentially radicalized youth is, according to Luz, not their responsibility.
If dogmatic secularism breeds violence-prone radicalized youth, why then does France
engage in it, and in so ostentatious and spectacular a form? Todd explains: with the exit of
zombie Catholics from belief and the fall of communism, laïcité is left without a counterpoint:
« Sans négliger l’existence concrète du fondamentalisme musulman ou du terrorisme, nous devons être
capables d’admettre que la France incroyante a besoin, pour trouver son équilibre, un bouc émissaire pour
remplacer son propre catholicisme, devenu inutilisable. … La diabolisation de l’Islam répond au besoin
intrinsèque d’une société totalement déchristianisée » (65).
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The movement defines itself by its opposite imprint. Ultimately, the imagemaking of the
spectacle and its reverberations on the internet serve the state and the money and power
insterests it protects.
V : The problems of social media expression and spectacle from Iran to Charlie
The problems of neoliberalism, and of expression as a yearning for transcendence are
essential to the discussion of the illusions and realities of expression in the age of social media.
Social media has caused a major shift in information consumption and of expression — how
public discourse, civic participation and critique of ideas occurs — and to which traditional
media have been forced to bow; it fosters a sense of collectivism, connectivity, and collaboration
that creates the illusion of a democratic authenticity, a resistance to injustice, and a direct link
between people in a world where withdrawal from public life has long been the norm (Sennett).
True, ordinary individuals can find, contribute to and create news on nearly equal grounds with
that of a news reporter, and the resulting devaluing of expertise (Nichols) has eroded the sense
that media outlets represent an authoritative view. But this assumption is problematic and, as the
Charlie and Invalides spectacles demonstrate, dangerous to the very democracy social media
appears to embody and defend. As a counterpoint to the staged Charlie and Invalides spectacles,
we will look at another event, and its impact on the perceived power of social media: 2009’s
election in Iran with its storm of social media activity that followed.
Social media in reality is an extension of traditional capitalist media and ultimately serves
the same purpose as its progenitor: to profit. Newspapers as we know them today, Habermass
points out, originally catered to the need for merchants to obtain information quickly to make
business decisions (14), directly linking them to the needs and goals of the bourgeois. Journalism
was always embedded with political interests and control (58), and newspapers developed as a
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forum for debates that protected the merchant class: “The public’s critical debate of political
issues had proved its mettle as a check on government, significantly at the nerve center of
bourgeois interests” (69). The corporate journalism of today, as Chomsky has said, fulfills the
same role, but is now embedded rather than oppositional to government:
“Take a look at the structure of the media system. The major media institutions are great corporations,
some of them parts of megacorporations. Like other businesses, they sell a product to a market. The
product that they sell is audiences. The market is other corporations, because they survive pretty much on
advertising in the modern period. It wasn’t always like this. There are other external influences, primarily
state power, which itself is very heavily under corporate control, and which has its own propaganda
institutions” (Smolski).

Ad-driven revenues of print and television have dwindled in the wake of social media’s
cultivation, manipulation, and sale of data, which can in some instances ultimately be employed
to control political outcomes (see Cadwalladr). It is perhaps it is too cynical, even irrational, to
suppose that this constitutes some grand overarching scheme of secret coordinated efforts, and
perhaps Chomsky’s view to that effect goes too far. However, the effect of so many media
entities with the ultimate goal of profits working to keep the governmental system in check
enough to protect business interests is sufficient to feed the industry consensus. Identifying the
beneficiaries of this system means untangling multi-layered media entities and subsidiaries,
alliances and collaborations, and examining evidence of reality appears to prove Sennett’s
assessment that “power becomes in advanced capitalism invisible; organizations protect
themselves from accountability by their very administrative complexity” (278). Like the 18th
century clubs Habermass describes, “mostly associations with rooms that provide the opportunity
both for reading newspapers and journals and, just as importantly, discussing what had been
read” (72), social media is the setting for a kind of information mania but without the sociability.
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Though we’d like to believe Facebook exists for our entertainment, its true utility is as a place
where consumers volunteer information about themselves. With clicks, conflict, and comments,
users feed the algorithms and data silos affiliated with corporations and the governments with
which they are entwined, feeding an apparatus of money and power (Malmgren).
In #iranelection, Negar Mottahedeh recounts the 2009 election protests and failed
attempts by the state’s propaganda machine to control the message concerning the events on the
street. Where “old media” also failed to cover the protests — in this case TV news network CNN
— protesters began to use social media to post their own accounts using the hashtag
#iranelection. Mottahedeh portrays the #iranelection hashtag as oppositional to corporate media
and neoliberalism, but this, too is an illusion #iranelection shares with the Charlie/Invalides
spectacles. In his view, neoliberalism dissipates workers, people, and solidarity to be almost
invisible and powerless: “Gone, in this environment, is the ability to recognize the appearance
and significance of collective formation and extended solidarities.” To him, social media
provides an antidote. His evidence is the case of the #iranelection hashtag versus #CNNfail:
“CNN may have noted the Iranian crisis. But its failure was to eschew any real emphasis on the networked
collective that emerged in the figure of "the people" in response. Here was an international and collective
act of dissent against the injustices of the state, and CNN was focusing its energies and professional
resources on corporate bids for bankruptcy in the United States.” (102)

This case indeed shows social media as vehicle for resistance to corporate (CNN) and established
(Iranian government) interests, but its efficacy is limited. Though Iranians put pressure on their
government, in the West spectators were drawn in with the promise of witnessing Iran’s
liberation and the embodiment of democratic fervor. But because media companies like

42

Facebook collect data and sell it to further manipulate political outcomes 7, the real result of such
an “uprising” still serves corporate/establishment goals, potentially to the detriment of
democracy.
For #iranelection the use of cell phones and Twitter was utterly necessary in the wake of
government crackdowns on freedom of assembly and speech, and on the election process itself.
And here is where the reality of the #JeSuisCharlie demonstrations and the romantic notions of
such a revolution part ways. Where #iranelection consisted of spontaneous in-person livetweeting as a last resort in opposition to government power, the spectacles of Charlie and
Invalides were performances in real life and echoed on social media in presence of the state’s
nodding approval or, in the case of Invalides, its central role. The Charlie marches were not only
tolerated, but fully supported by the French government as well as many others. So eager were
other countries to likewise co-opt the illusory power of the Marche Républicaine, that some of
their newspapers used Photoshop to alter photos — for example, those mentioned earlier of
world leaders supposedly “leading” the march with arms linked. The photo became a trompe
l’oeil, with leaders, each with a solemn expression, portrayed at the head of a group that was far
more sparse than it appeared. After the Charlie attacks, government buildings in capitals around
the world were lit with the tricolor or with the graphic “JeSuisCharlie”s logo projected on their
exterior. The support of governments and large populations of citizens in Western countries was
notable. Everyone wants a part to play in the spectacle of national mythology — the illusion is
too valuable to pass up, and as Barthes explains, meaning is already present (Mythologies, 117).

7

Raghavendra uses data to make the argument that, contrary to Facebook’s claims of
democratizing the Internet for users, the real end-goal was getting new users in India to use
Facebook in order to harvest their data.
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The pan-human, transcendent façade obscures more cynical forces, though Mottahedeh’s
description of the illusion begins to sound rather religious:
“This world [of social media] is an indestructible, ever amorphous networked association, which bridges a
partition that was opened up by the atomization of the worker and the disintegration of all collective
structures in favor of a neoliberal utopia in which all solidarities and collaborative standards were torn
down – ripped and dashed, in fact, in total disregard for the needs of the body, the senses of the worker, and
the voices of the people. Social media extends the reach of the sensorially mediated subject that appears
virally, now beyond the boundaries of the state and the multilateral practices that dictate its dealings with
the people, to impact and involve others, mimetically, in the space of politics” (103).

In other words, Mottahedeh claims that social media links humans again to each other and to the
higher cause of democracy – an idea with decidedly transdcendent overtones, particularly
because the word religion means to re-link, especially with God. Here, democracy is the stand-in
for the ultimate and in this case, the author posits that humans will transcend the limitations of
the imminent and effect change, saving the world from the injustices of neoliberalism. The
tendency to a good/evil narrative is plain, and this idealization of social media has a direct
impact on its perceived potential for furthering goals such as those embodied in Republican
values. More importantly, this structure falsely portrays social media and its promise as
oppositional to neoliberalism when in fact the two work together.
Though Charlie and Invalides generally diverge from the spontaneity that drove the Iran
protests, they have one thing in common with the #iranelection: the overpowering transcendent
feeling of connection among the crowds and with spectators around the world absorbed in a
“revolutionary memory” (31):
“A real change in the ecology of global media was underway. News stations and newspapers began to rely
heavily on social media for their stories during the course of the postelection crisis. … In the midst of the
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crisis [New York Times journalist Roger Cohen] wrote, "Iranians have borne witness – with cell phone
video images, with photographs, through Twitter and other forms of social networking – and have thereby
amassed an ineffaceable global indictment of the usurpers of June 12. Never again will Ahmadinejad speak
of justice without being undone by the Neda Effect” (10-11).

Iranians marched in the same spaces or on the same stage they did during the 1979 revolution,
with similar hope that a new era was beginning — an era reflected symbolically in social media’s
supplanting of traditional media coverage at and about the will of the people. Charlie and
Invalides echo a similar yearning for the energy and communion of a romanticized
Revolutionary past. Todd points to the evocation of Voltaire as an echo of 1789 and of 1905,
each initiating a new period of progress for the Republic (Todd, 88).
Voltaire’s Traité sur la Tolérance, was published in 1763 and gives insight to one of the
principal targets of Voltaire’s criticism: two dominant religions. He attacks the “Christian”
violence between Catholics and Protestants, which was the reality in France at that time, because
the two dominating factions polarized the nation into violent upheaval. He argued in favor of
pluralism precisely because having only two groups fighting for ultimate dominance, particularly
over religion, is too prone to allow either party to rationalize that God will sanction anything
they do.
Similarly, expression in this century, including on social media, intensifies the zealotry of
modern values into a model that neatly mimics both the religious wars of pre-Revolutionary
France and a general good/evil narrative at the root of Western religious narratives. This pattern
may well be seen in Fourest’s fiery rhetoric that comes out in absolute, religiously secular terms
against Islam. In this sense, the good/evil narrative of Christian belief that so fueled France’s
religious wars survives beyond the Revolution and has now placed secularism on one pole of
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belief and religion in general on the other. The « intrinsèque » need (according to Todd) for a
good/evil narrative is powerful and unsurprisingly, France portrays itself as the good. All
mythology serves this purpose. As Barthes explains, “Myth is a system of communication...
Myth is not defined by the object of its message, but by the way in which it utters this message :
there are formal limits to myth, there are no ‘substantial’ ones” (109). Robespierre acknowledged
the usefulness of mythmaking explicitly, but among zealot laïcs, its operation is
subconscious (once again relying on Todd’s notion of the zombie catholic). The violence of the
terrorist act leaves themes that are indeed « vagues, abstraits, extrêmement généraux » (Artaud,
80) – perfect fodder for symbol-making and perfect for spectacle.
Nowhere is this better displayed than in a video (shared on social media) of a French
father and his young son speaking to a reporter. The child explains that he is afraid because the
terrorists have guns. His father responds « Mais nous, on a des fleurs » . The child asks naively if
that will protect them, and the father answers yes (Le Petit Journal). The exchange reveals a faith
that the symbolic power that flowers (imbued with religious ceremonial symbolism) will protect
France, if not from real bullets, at least from any damage to the cause of unity. While this video
is moving on the surface, it feeds into the false image that the Charlie crowds were unified under
a single, overarching ideal. On the contrary, one should not assume of march attendees, Todd
says, the unanimity of purpose that the press portrayed. Le Defi Charlie offers analysis of
collected data on social media reactions, including the #JeSuisCharlie/#JeNeSuisPasCharlie
binary, and makes the same conclusion: the media’s story of solidarity was exaggerated (36).
Though it would fit neatly into a simplified narrative to which a secretly religious population
readily responds, the binary of good/evil is an oversimplification, problematic because it is
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particularly prone to distortion, and then to infinite repetition on social media. This works well
for the spectacle and the metteurs en scène who use it, even if indirectly, to propel their cause.
Social media extends all of these problems and tendencies both because re-Tweeting and
sharing — in essence replicating a message — is easy, fast, requires almost no critical thought
and can happen without limit in the digital sphere, and because people respond to emotionallycharged arguments. But if people react to headlines only, and if they share merely what someone
else wrote, can their expression ever be authentic? Whose spectacle are they promoting?
Sennett gives insight into how we got here. In the 19th century, Sennett argues, public and
private sectors changed places, and the new egalitarian culture threatened to reveal every man’s
station for what it was. No more protected and freed (in a sense) by pre-constructed codes of
class interaction understood among all, the new freedom of class movement meant that anyone
could be anyone. Expression was truncated by self-consciousness and public interactions became
stiffer as the privacy of home life became the place for spontaneity and feeling. The effect on the
theater was equally changed, as spectators, unable to emote in public, left expression and its
attendant authenticity of feeling to the artist to display on their behalf. All access to
transcendence eschewed in modern society, expression by the artist became surrogate for feeling,
and so the artist’s influence rocketed to worshipful heights.
Whereas Sennett identified street and theater exchanging places in the upheaval of the
19th century, in the 21st century, the two merge.
“Electronic communication is one means by which the very idea of public life has been put to an end. The
media have vastly increased the store of knowledge social groups have about each other, but have rendered
actual contact unnecessary … The needs which the electronic media are fulfilling are those cultural
impulses that formed over the whole rest of the last century and a half to withdraw from social interaction
in order to know and feel more as a person” (Sennett, 283).
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In other words, people project or act out a particular image of their private self publicly, with
little verification as to the image’s authenticity – supposedly this is the “real” self, and there is no
other. When all are actors and all are spectators, politics becomes a stage where actor-spectators
infinitely view and react to themselves and become captivated by their own imagemaking — a
mise en abîme. The image or selective reflection they create around themselves of the outside
social world becomes more important than reality, and everything comes to revolve around a
subjective point of view and personal feeling. “Narcissism is now mobilized in social relations
by a culture deprived of belief in the public and ruled by intimate feeling as a measure of the
meaning of reality” (Sennett, 326). Thus, social media intensifies the cultural tendency brought
about in the modern era to detach from the realities of the social sphere, and its effect is to
redefine rather than interact with and affect reality. This limits the real political effect citizens
might otherwise have on their governments in nations where democracy is the ideal. Social
media in this way handicaps rather than emboldens political action and democratic involvement.
To contrast the reality and contradictions of spectacle on social media, I will return to
Iran’s 2009 elections, in which the presence of citizens on social media became symbolically
charged, but was a spontaneous and pragmatic solution to the lack of media coverage for realtime events. It “required of those witnessing uprising in Iran to provide the world with evidence”
(Mottahedeh, 13) — a sacred calling. In contrast, the Charlie and Invalides spectacles benefited
from social media behaving as an echo of Western media’s single-minded coverage of the
French gatherings, which, as previously described, were simply displaced religious ritual. The
distinction between reality and the spectacle is not necessary for the purpose of the actorspectator expressing on social media. For him, a challenge to the illusion is equivalent to an
attack on the values the spectacle worships — blasphemy on blasphemy.
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Sennett describes this as a feeling of “bigger than” action — problematic in the context of
participation on social media because political expression is divorced from any ability to make
real change; instead its importance derives from the feeling that it can:
“The only actions the community undertakes are those of emotional housekeeping, purifying the
community of those who really don’t belong because they don’t feel as the others do. The community
cannot take in, absorb, and enlarge itself from the outside because then it will become impure. Thus a
collective personality comes to be set against the very essence of sociability – exchange – and a
psychological community becomes at war with societal complexity” (Sennett 311).

This, combined with what Sennett identifies as an already withdrawn habit of electronic media
widens rather than closes the space between people in the public sphere. Closeness and
communion are an illusion, and with complexity lost, so is the group’s ability to make the most
of politics to solve problems in real terms, rendering their power to those who will act.
The distance is made more acute as the group identities become ever more polarized –
more emotional housekeeping — and simplified. Fourest’s « vrai » et « faux » Charlies are
themselves caricatures of her group and the group she wishes to set as an enemy of the cause.
“Individual deviation threatens the strength of the whole; people have therefore to be watched and tested.
Distrust and solidarity, seemingly so opposed, are united. The absence, misunderstanding, or indifference
of the world outside the community is interpreted in the same way. Since fraternal feelings are immediate
and strongly felt, how can others not understand, why don’t they respond in kind, why won’t the world
bend to emotional desires? The answer to these questions can only be that the world outside the community
is less real, less authentic than the life within. The consequence of that answer is not a challenge to the
outside, but a dismissal of it, a turning away, into the watchful sharing with others who “understand.” This
is the peculiar sectarianism of a secular society.” (Sennett, 311)

The contrast also lays bare social media’s tendency toward binary representations. If the
French government and demonstrators support of “free speech,” which Charlie Hebdo’s
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defenders claim is their cause, its detractors can only be seen therefore as being its adversary.
This works on a rhetorical level to delegitimize any critique of Charlie’s content or its allies, and
to further portray French Muslims as existing in opposition — or as a threat — to the most
sacred French values. Fourest even accuses those who would untwine this fatal pairing as
supporting implicitly the violence of the terrorists. This interpretation of not only the violent acts
themselves, but of the more nuanced critiques of Charlie Hebdo’s content, lumps both together
in a single anti-Western category. In Todd’s words:
« Est-on si sûr qu’à un moment quelconque, l’idéologie révolutionnaire aurait pu exister par sa seule force,
sans le soutien de sa contradiction Catholique ? La disparition ultime de l’Église laisse un vide dans la vie
du laïc français. La fin du catholicisme fut aussi une crise pour la France laïque. …Jusqu’à l’effondrement
de la religion dans ses provinces périphériques … de l’Hexagone, la laïcité n’avait jamais eu à se définir
dans l’absolu dans un monde sans Dieu. Elle avait pu se contenter de jouer en contre » (64).

The diabolisation of Islam, then, will serve as a justification for security measures, including
those limiting travel, freedom of assembly, and speech. Hollande’s early prepared speech as well
as his address after the November attacks use oppositional, religiously coded language
interspersed with talk of such security measures — effectively conditioning the population to
accept that with every attack and every hint of danger, the state will empower itself, and not just
against particular violence, but toward a population associated with those who committed the
terrorist acts (see Chrisafis, “Nothing’s changed”).
Hashtags in particular, though Mottahedeh sees them as showing solidarity, open the way
for identity rather than action to become the principal expression: not what one does or what one
believes, but who one is. Action is further distanced. After the Charlie Hebdo attacks,
#JeSuisCharlie was placed opposite #JeNeSuisPasCharlie, leaving apparently only two choices
of symbolic identity. Though some hashtag compsitions expressed more nuance, the majority fit
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somewhere in the boundaries of the two (see Le Défi Charlie). Even those who may feel that one
or the other doesn’t adequately represent their views may also feel the need to belong
somewhere, and so side with one or the other camp. But the binary, in addition to framing the
discussion, produces arguments, likes, comments, and re-Tweets. Coaxing nuance out of the
hashtags becomes a comment-fomenting activity and a Twitter trend bombshell. Neither hurts
business, since social media platforms earn money the more they know about users’ political
dispositions as well as shopping habits (Malmgren). In addition, social media absorbs users,
keeping them off the streets, gazing in the infinity mirror, and out of politics.
The binary also allows metteurs en scène like Fourest to frame the discussion. If there are
only two categories and any attempt at nuance is suspect, it has a chilling effect on expression.
The direction opposition and expression may go is pre-defined, and what is off limits remains off
limits. Colonial violence, once again, serves as an example. This is perhaps one reason why
Fourest attacks Tariq Ramadan: whether he is lying (le double discours) or is expressing multiple
facets of the reality of life for European Muslims, the complexity he describes as inherent to their
experience is unacceptable and are grounds for rejection. If Todd’s claim is true — that the
neoliberal elite classes and the media who promotes their narrative are truly behind the curtain of
the “sham” marches — then Fourest’s attack on Ramadan also makes sense because Ramadan, in
his book To Be a European Muslim, makes a similar point, though more subtly.
Fourrest quickly dispatches with Ramadan’s validity, dismissing him as a terrorist
sympathizer, « l’intillectuell-prédicateur » in her book’s section titled “Des tartuffes intégristes”
(30). However, his writings on identity of Muslims in Europe are worth perusal. The energy the
French ruling class has spent discrediting Ramadan and preventing him from speaking in public
forums (Saad) places him in an adversarial relationship with the elite French left that Fourest
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represents. His very identity, as well as his ideas, are evidently a threat to them. In just a few
sentences, he calls into question almost every assumption on which today’s laïcité — as opposed
to the language of the 1905 law (see “On n’est pas couché”) — is based. As established earlier,
the state and its media were engendered with the same goal — to protect capital and the power of
those who control it. Habermass is concerned with this bourgeois history; Todd continues
examining it in its current manifestation, which he associates with the Marche Républicaine.
Naturally, defenders of the march who hold it to be a sacred and inviolate moment for France
reject this kind of questioning of Charlie’s motives. The nuance Ramadan slowly establishes in
his writings on Islamic law, society, and spirituality is anathema to Charlie’s surrogates like
Fourest because Ramadan diminishes the polarization that feeds the “zombie Catholic” good/evil
narrative and the emotional housekeeping Sennett identifies as the result of public expression’s
decline. Ramadan promotes the realization of Muslim selfhood as a buoy in times of
globalization (like the adoption of the Euro that the “zombie Catholics” were in favor of). He
insists that Muslims interpret their own narrative rather than be subjects to those who would
define them as outsiders, thus crushing the strategy and goal of the Charlie and Invalides
spectacles wherein the French and the French government are speaking and interpreting for
them. He encourages Muslims to remove themselves from the position of adversary to European
culture, destroying the possibility of a continued good/evil binary to frame the Muslim question.
And he likens the acceptability of Muslims as full citizens in Europe to the same struggle Jews
faced — anathema to Fourest who insists Dreyfus is not Kouachi (Fourest, 77). Here it is
appropriate to note that Fourest rightly alludes to the fact that Dreyfus was falsely accused by
those suspicious of Jews and was himself a loyal Frenchman, while Kouachi was undoubtedly
one of the perpetrators of the Charlie Hebdo bombings and attack on a kosher market. However,
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Fourest’s discourse, even given the distinction she makes, is not limited to affecting life for real
terrorists like Kouachi, but feeds a paranoia likely to affect innocent Muslims who are more in
the vein of the good Frenchman Dreyfus. In a few paragraphs, Ramadan undercuts the main
thrusts of Fourest’s discourse — both her explicit arguments and her unconscious methods
described above.
His « double discours » irks the #JeSuisCharlie crowd (Saad) because he has another
identity, outside of “Frenchness” (though he is Swiss) and he speaks it fluently. In discussing the
realities and complexities of living as a Muslim believer in the modern world, he does no
differently than Robspierre did, dressing secular discourse in religious language, or as Fourest
does, coating religious language with secular themes. But he, as Fourest remarks of another highprofile Muslim, is « [le seul] autour de la table à devoir dire que je n’ai rien à voir avec [les
terrorists] » , or whatever the laïcs want him to say (Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 42).
Interestingly, he makes a connection between a rapidly-changing world moved by the
forces of globalization and the need for Muslims to study out a concrete identity for themselves,
one that links them directly with God, to whom they owe their first duty (Ramadan, To Be a
European Muslim, 189). He goes on: “For Muslims to understand who they are and what they
stand for means that they are able to determine their identity per se, according to their Islamic
references and no longer through the image others develop of them as if they were but objects of
some alien elaboration… It is only by acting this way that European Muslims will feel that they
are subjects of their own history… To be subjects of their own history also means that they will
eventually go beyond this pernicious feeling of being foreigners, of being different, of being an
obvious manifestation of an insoluble problem” (189, emphasis added). In other words, he
encourages Muslims to do their own myth-making, to become the metteur en scène of their own
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spectacle. This is obviously an affront to the group that holds this power over them and whose
own mythology so easily colors every interpretation of their behavior. He also makes the
connection to the Jews’ struggle for “acceptable” identity as Europeans (162), a notion that
fittingly points to Charlie’s past as anti-Dreyfussards and Vichistes. These are all items which
might strike a nerve if Todd is correct that the elites largely share in the historical consciousness
not just of France, but of a zealous group of croyants.
What he proposes for Muslims, were they to pursue his ideas as a group, makes their
position as the bouc emissaire untenable, and returns power to them as metteurs en scène of their
own story. This would indeed be deeply unsettling to French elites who depend particularly on
the power they derive from their position and from the spectacle they produce to retain it.
VI. Conclusion
Though this study may appear to attack French secularism, it is done with an eye to its
preservation and ultimately with a reverence for the equality and justice that Republican values
espouse. Without a more fair interpretation and application of laïcité, the French Republic
introduces far too much hypocrisy and alienates too many potential supporters to effectively
fight the seductive rhetoric of such groups as ISIS, who prey on the kind of disaffected exclusion
France’s current cultural and economic situation produces. And without jealously preserving
freedom of speech from government interference, there is no democracy to protect. The survival
of the Revolution’s tenets hinge as much on Western nations living up to them as on a physicial
defeat of any adversary. Without an honest and critical look beyond the rhetoric and mythlogy at
what we are really doing to other nations and individuals in economic, social, and foreign policy,
we cannot correct our course. The challenges described and dissected in this study are unique to
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France, but are symbolic and relevant to those the West as a cohort is facing both in real life and
on social media.
So desperate are modern social media users for a bit of transcendent feeling, that they
accept theatrical pronouncements of feeling as authentic instead of feeling anything themselves.
Events easily become sacralized and falsified this way — a shell of expression, especially when
combined with the impulse for automatic sharing and re-tweeting. As mentioned earlier, on
Slate.fr, the text of Hollande’s speech is set up to be tweeted in short, convenient quotes when
users mouse over it. One need not even be so involved as to type out the 135 or fewer characters
of an inspiring passage; that task is automated for the user. Corporate tech and cultural dogma
combine so users’ only and most important action is a click. Social media, rather than freeing the
world from elite influence and from the spectacles they produce, has rather extended their power
by narrowing the parameters, limiting the effectiveness, and increasing the self-satisfaction of
expressive acts, all while profiting from the information divulged when users express themselves
online (Malmgren).
If Habermass is correct and the state was formed to protect capital and the classes who
own it, then social media serves capital and not democracy. Indeed, democracy is itself
antithetical to such a useful tool of potential totalitarian control as social media. Without the
adversarial binary that plays so well on social media, the spectacle’s prospects for replication
online are diminished, and so is the digital “communion” that empowers and animates them.
Without extremism, neither extreme security measures and their potential for limiting
expression, nor the indefinite extension of the state of emergency — like the one France
instituted after the November attacks — can be justified.
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On this point, the magazine Le Canard Enchaîné comments, « L’etat d’urgence sert
d’abord à interdire, et la tentation est grande de s’en abuser » (3). According to the magazine,
« l’ONU, se sont, eux, alarmés, ‘des restrictions excessives et disproportionnées sur les libertés

fondamentales’. Ils soupçonnent même la France de profiter de la lutte contre le terrorisme – en
‘détournant’ la ‘forte mobilization des forces de sécurité’ pour se débarrasser de tout un tas de
problèmes sans rapport avec le terrorisme ». (“Abus des tas d’urgence”, 7). On November 18,
« un amendment socialiste qui instaurait le contrôle de la presse pendant l’état d’urgence a faille

être vote » (9). The Hollande government, days after the Bataclan, and less than two weeks
before he would give a speech extolling the glorious communion in the name of freedom of
expression that followed the Charlie Hebdo attacks, proposed a law giving it power to limit the
press.
This is dangerous for democratic nations in several ways. It is alarming to see the ease
with which the state, if so disposed, can use the ideals of democracy to disarm democracy, and to
use the worship of rationality to draw out the irrational in us. And while social media users
willingly pass along the narratives that exist on social media and that were created for that
purpose, satisfied to feel part of a like-minded group, they are allowing the manipulation and
messaging of those in power to continue unchecked. It isn’t that users are apathetic, but that their
energy is expended on the wrong ideas, their arguments made about the wrong issues, or their
focus trained on the wrong questions. As we have seen in the election of Donald Trump to the
U.S. presidency, possibly owed in part to the manipulation of social media data (see
Cadwalladr), totalitarian impulses can take subtle form. But Trump is merely a symptom of a
larger problem in the West: while extolling our virtues and imbibing our own mythology, we
leave behind reality, much of which tells a story that Western interests have for half a
56

millennium been brutally at odds with the well-being of the rest of the world, leaving
Enlightened democracy an unfulfilled shell of itself. Our willingness to indulge in spectacle like
the #JeSuisCharlie march, to content ourselves with a social media post that makes us feel
momentarily satisfied, is to enter a darkened theater, not come out. If rationality and
Enlightenment give the West its edge, then we must behave rationally. If violence is so abhorrent
and defiance of it so sacred that we march in “communion” against it, then violence at the hands
of Western governments must be equally abhorrent and the peace of non-Western nations
equally sacred. It does no help to the cause of democracy and the West to destroy our legitimacy
by our own hypocrisy — a hypocrisy that fuels ISIS and Al Qaeda (Marcetic). Though this paper
reveals that in fact the existence of violent opposition to the West serves the dominant powers
within liberal nations, I propose that behaving rationally and acting in our own interest of selfpreservation, today means diffusing that opposition. If the elite classes oppress minorities —
unwittingly or intentionally — while claiming to extol the values of the Enlightenment, to
nominally reject violence while engaging in war for profit, then the claims they make ring
hollow, eroding trust in both the institutions they control and the collective ideal that animates
democratic action. To regain that trust, rather than undermine corporate media with its populist
equivalent, we must re-establish journalism, its dissemination and discussion in a way that
allows a return to Sennett’s concept of public man — to true sociability.
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